"www.GetIPv6.info decal" from Phil Wolff on Flickr

Hurricane Electric IPv6 Gateway on Raspbian for Raspberry Pi

NOTE: This article was replaced on 2019-03-12 by a github repository where I now use Vagrant instead of a Raspberry Pi, because I was having some power issues with my Raspberry Pi. Also, using this method means I can easily use an Ansible Playbook. The following config will still work(!) however I prefer this Vagrant/Ansible workflow for this, so won’t update this blog post any further.

Following an off-hand remark from a colleague at work, I decided I wanted to set up a Raspberry Pi as a Hurricane Electric IPv6 6in4 tunnel router. Most of the advice around (in particular, this post about setting up IPv6 on the Raspberry Pi Forums) related to earlier version of Raspbian, so I thought I’d bring it up-to-date.

I installed the latest available version of Raspbian Stretch Lite (2018-11-13) and transferred it to a MicroSD card. I added the file ssh to the boot volume and unmounted it. I then fitted it into my Raspberry Pi, and booted it. While it was booting, I set a static IPv4 address on my router (192.168.1.252) for the Raspberry Pi, so I knew what IP address it would be on my network.

I logged into my Hurricane Electric (HE) account at tunnelbroker.net and created a new tunnel, specifying my public IP address, and selecting my closest HE endpoint. When the new tunnel was created, I went to the “Example Configurations” tab, and selected “Debian/Ubuntu” from the list of available OS options. I copied this configuration into my clipboard.

I SSH’d into the Pi, and gave it a basic config (changed the password, expanded the disk, turned off “predictable network names”, etc) and then rebooted it.

After this was done, I created a file in /etc/network/interfaces.d/he-ipv6 and pasted in the config from the HE website. I had to change the “local” line from the public IP I’d provided HE with, to the real IP address of this box. Note that any public IPs (that is, not 192.168.x.x addresses) in the config files and settings I’ve noted refer to documentation addressing (TEST-NET-2 and the IPv6 documentation address ranges)

auto he-ipv6
iface he-ipv6 inet6 v4tunnel
        address 2001:db8:123c:abd::2
        netmask 64
        endpoint 198.51.100.100
        local 192.168.1.252
        ttl 255
        gateway 2001:db8:123c:abd::1

Next, I created a file in /etc/network/interfaces.d/eth0 and put the following configuration in, using the first IPv6 address in the “routed /64” range listed on the HE site:

auto eth0
iface eth0 inet static
    address 192.168.1.252
    gateway 192.168.1.254
    netmask 24
    dns-nameserver 8.8.8.8
    dns-nameserver 8.8.4.4

iface eth0 inet6 static
    address 2001:db8:123d:abc::1
    netmask 64

Next, I disabled the DHCPd service by issuing systemctl stop dhcpcd.service Late edit (2019-01-22): Note, a colleague mentioned that this should have actually been systemctl stop dhcpcd.service && systemctl disable dhcpcd.service – good spot! Thanks!! This ensures that if, for some crazy reason, the router stops offering the right DHCP address to me, I can still access this box on this IP. Huzzah!

I accessed another host which had IPv6 access, and performed both a ping and an SSH attempt. Both worked. Fab. However, this now needs to be blocked, as we shouldn’t permit anything to be visible downstream from this gateway.

I’m using the Uncomplicated Firewall (ufw) which is a simple wrapper around IPTables. Let’s create our policy.

# First install the software
sudo apt update && sudo apt install ufw -y

# Permits inbound IPv4 SSH to this host - which should be internal only. 
# These rules allow tailored access in to our managed services
ufw allow in on eth0 app DNS
ufw allow in on eth0 app OpenSSH

# These rules accept all broadcast and multicast traffic
ufw allow in on eth0 to 224.0.0.0/4 # Multicast addresses
ufw allow in on eth0 to 255.255.255.255 # Global broadcast
ufw allow in on eth0 to 192.168.1.255 # Local broadcast

# Alternatively, accept everything coming in on eth0
# If you do this one, you don't need the lines above
ufw allow in on eth0

# Setup the default rules - deny inbound and routed, permit outbound
ufw default deny incoming 
ufw default deny routed
ufw default allow outgoing

# Prevent inbound IPv6 to the network
# Also, log any drops so we can spot them if we have an issue
ufw route deny log from ::/0 to 2001:db8:123d:abc::/64

# Permit outbound IPv6 from the network
ufw route allow from 2001:db8:123d:abc::/64

# Start the firewall!
ufw enable

# Check the policy
ufw status verbose
ufw status numbered

Most of the documentation I found suggested running radvd for IPv6 address allocation. This basically just allocates on a random basis, and, as far as I can make out, each renewal gives the host a new IPv6 address. To make that work, I performed apt-get update && apt-get install radvd -y and then created this file as /etc/radvd.conf. If all you want is a floating IP address with no static assignment – this will do it…

interface eth0
{
    AdvSendAdvert on;
    MinRtrAdvInterval 3;
    MaxRtrAdvInterval 10;
    prefix 2001:db8:123d:abc::/64
    {
        AdvOnLink on;
        AdvAutonomous on;
    };
   route ::/0 {
   };
};

However, this doesn’t give me the ability to statically assign IPv6 addresses to hosts. I found that a different IPv6 allocation method will do static addressing, based on your MAC address called SLAAC (note there are some privacy issues with this, but I’m OK with them for now…) In this mode assuming the prefix as before – 2001:db8:123d:abc:: and a MAC address of de:ad:be:ef:01:23, your IPv6 address will be something like: 2001:db8:123d:abc:dead:beff:feef:0123and this will be repeatably so – because you’re unlikely to change your MAC address (hopefully!!).

This SLAAC allocation mode is available in DNSMasq, which I’ve consumed before (in a Pi-Hole). To use this, I installed DNSMasq with apt-get update && apt-get install dnsmasq -y and then configured it as follows:

interface=eth0
listen-address=127.0.0.1
# DHCPv6 - Hurricane Electric Resolver and Google's
dhcp-option=option6:dns-server,[2001:470:20::2],[2001:4860:4860::8888]
# IPv6 DHCP scope
dhcp-range=2001:db8:123d:abc::, slaac

I decided to move from using my router as a DHCP server, to using this same host, so expanded that config as follows, based on several posts, but mostly centred around the MAN page (I’m happy to have this DNSMasq config improved if you’ve got any suggestions ;) )

# Stuff for DNS resolution
domain-needed
bogus-priv
no-resolv
filterwin2k
expand-hosts
domain=localnet
local=/localnet/
log-queries

# Global options
interface=eth0
listen-address=127.0.0.1

# Set these hosts as the DNS server for your network
# Hurricane Electric and Google
dhcp-option=option6:dns-server,[2001:470:20::2],2001:4860:4860::8888]

# My DNS servers are:
server=1.1.1.1                # Cloudflare's DNS server
server=8.8.8.8                # Google's DNS server

# IPv4 DHCP scope
dhcp-range=192.168.1.10,192.168.1.210,12h
# IPv6 DHCP scope
dhcp-range=2001:db8:123d:abc::, slaac

# Record the DHCP leases here
dhcp-leasefile=/run/dnsmasq/dhcp-lease

# DHCPv4 Router
dhcp-option=3,192.168.1.254

So, that’s what I’m doing now! Hope it helps you!

Late edit (2019-01-22): In issue 129 of the “Awesome Self Hosted Newsletter“, I found a post called “My New Years Resolution: Learn IPv6“… which uses a pfSense box and a Hurricane Electric tunnel too. Fab!

Header image is “www.GetIPv6.info decal” by “Phil Wolff” on Flickr and is released under a CC-BY-SA license. Used with thanks!

Creating Self Signed certificates in Ansible

In my day job, I sometimes need to use a self-signed certificate when building a box. As I love using Ansible, I wanted to make the self-signed certificate piece something that was part of my Ansible workflow.

Here follows a bit of basic code that you could use to work through how the process of creating a self-signed certificate would work. I would strongly recommend using something more production-ready (e.g. LetsEncrypt) when you’re looking to move from “development” to “production” :)

---
- hosts: localhost
  vars:
  - dnsname: your.dns.name
  - tmppath: "./tmp/"
  - crtpath: "{{ tmppath }}{{ dnsname }}.crt"
  - pempath: "{{ tmppath }}{{ dnsname }}.pem"
  - csrpath: "{{ tmppath }}{{ dnsname }}.csr"
  - pfxpath: "{{ tmppath }}{{ dnsname }}.pfx"
  - private_key_password: "password"
  tasks:
  - file:
      path: "{{ tmppath }}"
      state: absent
  - file:
      path: "{{ tmppath }}"
      state: directory
  - name: "Generate the private key file to sign the CSR"
    openssl_privatekey:
      path: "{{ pempath }}"
      passphrase: "{{ private_key_password }}"
      cipher: aes256
  - name: "Generate the CSR file signed with the private key"
    openssl_csr:
      path: "{{ csrpath }}"
      privatekey_path: "{{ pempath }}"
      privatekey_passphrase: "{{ private_key_password }}"
      common_name: "{{ dnsname }}"
  - name: "Sign the CSR file as a CA to turn it into a certificate"
    openssl_certificate:
      path: "{{ crtpath }}"
      privatekey_path: "{{ pempath }}"
      privatekey_passphrase: "{{ private_key_password }}"
      csr_path: "{{ csrpath }}"
      provider: selfsigned
  - name: "Convert the signed certificate into a PKCS12 file with the attached private key"
    openssl_pkcs12:
      action: export
      path: "{{ pfxpath }}"
      name: "{{ dnsname }}"
      privatekey_path: "{{ pempath }}"
      privatekey_passphrase: "{{ private_key_password }}"
      passphrase: password
      certificate_path: "{{ crtpath }}"
      state: present

Hacker at Keyboard

What happens on an IT Penetration Test

I recently was asked to describe what happens in a penetration test (pentest), how it’s organised and what happens after the test is completed.

Some caveats first:

  • While I’ve been involved in escorting penetration testers in controlled areas, and helping to provide environments for the tests to occur in, I’ve not been heavily involved in the set-up of one, so some of the details in that area are likely to be a bit fuzzy.
  • I’m not involved in procurement in any way, so I can’t endorse or discredit any particular testing organisations.
  • This is a personal viewpoint and doesn’t represent a professional recommendation of how a penetration test should or typically does occur.

So, what actually happens?…

Before the pentest begins, a testing firm would be sourced and the “Terms of Engagement” (TOE), or perhaps a list of requirements would be defined. This might result in a list of tasks that are expected to be performed, and some idea on resources required. It would also be the point where the initiator (the organisation getting the test performed) defines what is “In Scope” (is available to be tested) and what is “Out Of Scope” (and must not be tested).

Some of the usual tasks are:

  • Internet Scan (the testers will have a testing appliance that will scan all IPs provided to them, and all open ports on those IPs, looking for vulnerable services, servers and responding applications).
  • Black Box [See note below] Red Team test (the testers are probing the network as though they were malicious outsiders with no knowledge of the system, similar to the sorts of things you might see in hacker movies – go through discovered documentation, socially engineer access to environments, run testing applications like NMAP and Metasploit, and generally see what stuff appears to be publicly accessible, and from there see how the environment appears once you have a foothold).
  • White Box test (the testers have access to internal documentation and/or source code about the environment they’re testing, and thus can run customised and specific tests against the target environment).
  • Configuration Analysis (access to servers, source code, firewall policies or network topology documentation intending to check where flaws may have been introduced).
  • Social Engineering test (see how amenable staff, customers and suppliers are to providing access to the target environment for your testing team).
  • Physical access test (prove whether the testing team can gain physical access to elements of your target, e.g. servers, documentation, management stations, signing keys, etc).
  • Some testing firms will also stress test any Denial Of Service Mitigations you may have in-place, but these must be carefully negotiated first with your bandwidth providers, their peering firms and so on, as they will more-than-likely disrupt more than just your services! DO NOT ENGAGE A DOS TEST LIGHTLY!

Once the Terms have been agreed and the duration of these tests have been ironed out (some tests could go on indefinitely, but you wouldn’t *really* want to pay the bills for an indefinite Black Box test, for example!), a project plan is usually defined showing these stages. Depending on the complexity of your environment, I might expect a reasonable duration for a small estate being approximately a day or two for each test. In a larger estate, particularly where little-to-no automation has been implemented, you may find (for example) a thorough Configuration Analysis of your server configurations taking weeks or even months.

Depending on how true-to-life the test “should” be, you may have the Physical Security assessment and Social Engineering tests be considered part of the Black Box test, or perhaps you may purposefully provide some entry point for the testing team to reduce the entry time. Most of the Black Box tests I’ve been involved in supporting have started from giving the testers access to a point inside your trusted network (e.g. a server which has been built for the purpose of giving access to testers or a VPN entry point with a “lax” firewall policy). Others will provide a “standard” asset (e.g. laptop) and user credential to the testing firm. Finally, some environments will put the testing firm through “recruitment” and put them in-situ in the firm for a week or two to bed them in before the testing starts… this is pretty extreme however!!

The Black Box test will typically be run before any others (except perhaps the Social Engineering and Physical Access tests) and without the knowledge of the “normal” administrators. This will also test the responses of the “Blue Team” (the system administrators and any security operations centre teams) to see whether they would notice an in-progress, working attack by a “Red Team” (the attackers).

After the Black Box test is completed, the “Blue Team” may be notified that there was a pentest, and then (providing it is being run) the testing organisation will start a White Box test will be given open access to the tested environment.

The Configuration Check will normally start with hands-on time with members of the “Blue Team” to see configuration and settings, and will compare these settings against known best practices. If there is an application being tested where source code is available to the testers, then they may check the source code against programming bad practices.

Once these tests are performed, the testing organisation will write a report documenting the state of the environment and rate criticality of the flaws against current recommendations.

The report would be submitted to the organisation who requested the test, and then the *real* fun begins – either fixing the flaws, or finger pointing at who let the flaws occur… Oh, and then scheduling the next pentest :)

I hope this has helped people who may be wondering what happens during a pentest!

Just to noteIf you want to know more about pentests, and how they work in the real world, check out the podcast “Darknet Diaries“, and in particular episode 6 – “The Beirut Bank Job”. To get an idea of what the pentest is supposed to simulate, (although it’s a fictional series) “Mr Robot” (<- Amazon affiliate link) is very close to how I would imagine a sequence of real-world “Red Team” attacks might look like, and experts seem to agree!

Image Credit: “hacker” by Dani Latorre licensed under a Creative Commons, By-Attribution, Share-Alike license.


Additional note; 2018-12-12: Following me posting this to the #security channel on the McrTech Slack group, one of the other members of that group (Jay Harris from Digital Interruption) mentioned that I’d conflated a black box test and a red team test. A black box test is like a white box test, but with no documentation or access to the implementing team. It’s much slower than a white box test, because you don’t have access to the people to ask “why did you do this” or “what threat are you trying to mitigate here”. He’s right. This post was based on a previous experience I had with a red team test, but that they’d referred to it as a black box test, because that’s what the engagement started out as. Well spotted Jay!

He also suggested reading his post in a similar vein.

One to read/watch: IPsec and IKE Tutorial

Ever been told that IPsec is hard? Maybe you’ve seen it yourself? Well, Paul Wouters and Sowmini Varadhan recently co-delivered a talk at the NetDev conference, and it’s really good.

Sowmini’s and Paul’s slides are available here: https://www.files.netdevconf.org/d/a18e61e734714da59571/

A complete recording of the tutorial is here. Sowmini’s part of the tutorial (which starts first in the video) is quite technically complex, looking at specifically the way that Linux handles the packets through the kernel. I’ve focused more on Paul’s part of the tutorial (starting at 26m23s)… but my interest was piqued from 40m40s when he starts to actually show how “easy” configuration is. There are two quick run throughs of typical host-to-host IPsec and subnet-to-subnet IPsec tunnels.

A key message for me, which previously hadn’t been at all clear in IPsec using {free,libre,open}swan is that they refer to Left and Right as being one party and the other… but the node itself works out if it’s “left” or “right” so the *SAME CONFIG* can be used on both machines. GENIUS.

Also, when you’re looking at the config files, anything prefixed with an @ symbol is something that doesn’t need resolving to something else.

It’s well worth a check-out, and it’s inspired me to take another look at IPsec for my personal VPNs :)

I should note that towards the end, Paul tried to run a selection of demonstrations in Opportunistic Encryption (which basically is a way to enable encryption between two nodes, even if you don’t have a pre-established VPN with them). Because of issues with the conference wifi, plus the fact that what he’s demoing isn’t exactly production-grade yet, it doesn’t really work right, and much of the rest of the video (from around 1h10m) is him trying to show that working while attendees are running through the lab, and having conversations about those labs with the attendees.

Setting UK keyboards in Vagrant Ubuntu Machines, using Ansible

Wow, now there’s a specific post title…

I use Ansible… quite a bit :) and one of the things I do with Ansible is to have a standard build desktop that I can create using Vagrant. Recently I upgraded the base to Ubuntu 18.04, and it annoyed me that I still didn’t have a working keyboard combination, so I kept getting US keyboards. I spent 20 minutes sorting it out, and here’s how to do it.

- name: Set keyboard layout
  debconf:
    name: "keyboard-configuration"
    question: "keyboard-configuration/{{ item.key }}"
    value: "{{ item.value }}"
    vtype: "{{ item.type|default('string') }}"
  with_items:
  - { key: "altgr", value: "The default for the keyboard layout", vtype: "select" }
  - { key: "compose", value: "No compose key", vtype: "select" }
  - { key: "ctrl_alt_bksp", value: "false", type: "boolean" }
  - { key: "variant", value: "English (UK)", vtype: "select" }
  - { key: "layout", value: "English (UK)", vtype: "select" }
  - { key: "model", value: "Generic 105-key PC (intl.)", vtype: "select" }

I posted how I got to this point over at the Server Fault post that got me most of the way. https://serverfault.com/a/912342/14832

Ansible Behaviour Change

For those of you who are working with #Ansible… Ansible 2.5 is out, and has an unusual documentation change around a key Ansible concept – `with_` loops Where you previously had:

with_dict: "{{ your_fact }}"
or
with_subelements:
- "{{ your_fact }}"
- some_subkey

This now should be written like this:

loop: "{{ lookup('dict', your_fact) }}"
and
loop: "{{ lookup('subelements', your_fact, 'some_subkey') }}"

Fear not, I hear you say, It’s fine, of course the documentation suggests that this is “how it’s always been”…… HA HA HA Nope. This behaviour is new as of 2.5, and needs ansible to be updated to the latest version. As far as I can tell, there’s no way to indicate to Ansible “Oh, BTW, this needs to be running on 2.5 or later”… so I wrote a role that does that for you.

ansible-galaxy install JonTheNiceGuy.version-check

You’re welcome :)

More useful URLs:

Creating OpenStack “Allowed Address Pairs” for Clusters with Ansible

This post came about after a couple of hours of iterations, so I can’t necessarily quote all the sources I worked from, but I’ll do my best!

In OpenStack (particularly in the “Kilo” release I’m working with), if you have a networking device that will pass traffic on behalf of something else (e.g. Firewall, IDS, Router, Transparent Proxy) you need to tell the virtual NIC that the interface is allowed to pass traffic for other IP addresses, as OpenStack applies by default a “Same Origin” firewall rule to the interface. Defining this in OpenStack is more complex than it could be, because for some reason, you can’t define 0.0.0.0/0 as this allowed address pair, so instead you have to define 0.0.0.0/1 and 128.0.0.0/1.

Here’s how you define those allowed address pairs (note, this assumes you’ve got some scaffolding in place to define things like “network_appliance”):

allowed_address_pairs: "{% if (item.0.network_appliance|default('false')|lower() == 'true') or (item.1.network_appliance|default('false')|lower() == 'true') %}[{'ip_address': '0.0.0.0/1'}, {'ip_address': '128.0.0.0/1'}]{% else %}{{ item.0.allowed_address_pairs|default(omit) }}{% endif %}"

OK, so we’ve defined the allowed address pairs! We can pass traffic across our firewall. But (and there’s always a but), the product I’m working with at the moment has a floating MAC address in a cluster, when you define an HA pair. They have a standard schedule for how each port’s floating MAC is assigned… so here’s what I’ve ended up with (and yes, I know it’s a mess!)

allowed_address_pairs: "{% if (item.0.network_appliance|default('false')|lower() == 'true') or (item.1.network_appliance|default('false')|lower() == 'true') %}[{'ip_address': '0.0.0.0/1'},{'ip_address': '128.0.0.0/1'}{% if item.0.ha is defined and item.0.ha != '' %}{% for vdom in range(0,40, 10) %},{'ip_address': '0.0.0.0/1','mac_address': '{{ item.0.floating_mac_prefix|default(item.0.image.floating_mac_prefix|default(floating_mac_prefix)) }}:{% if item.0.ha.group_id|default(0) < 16 %}0{% endif %}{{ '%0x' | format(item.0.ha.group_id|default(0)|int) }}:{% if vdom+(item.1.interface|default('1')|replace('port', '')|int)-1 < 16 %}0{% endif %}{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+(item.1.interface|default('1')|replace('port', '')|int)-1) }}'}, {'ip_address': '128.0.0.0/1','mac_address': '{{ item.0.floating_mac_prefix|default(item.0.image.floating_mac_prefix|default(floating_mac_prefix)) }}:{% if item.0.ha.group_id|default(0) < 16 %}0{% endif %}{{ '%0x' | format(item.0.ha.group_id|default(0)|int) }}:{% if vdom+(item.1.interface|default('0')|replace('port', '')|int)-1 < 16 %}0{% endif %}{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+(item.1.interface|default('1')|replace('port', '')|int)-1) }}'}{% endfor %}{% endif %}]{% else %}{{ item.0.allowed_address_pairs|default(omit) }}{% endif %}"

Let's break this down a bit. The vendor says that each port gets a standard prefix, (e.g. DE:CA:FB:AD) then the penultimate octet is the "Cluster ID" number in hex, and then the last octet is the sum of the port number (zero-indexed) added to a VDOM number, which increments in 10's. We're only allowed to assign 10 "allowed address pairs" to an interface, so I've got the two originals (which are assigned to "whatever" the defined mac address is of the interface), and four passes around. Other vendors (e.g. this one) do things differently, so I'll probably need to revisit this once I know how the next one (and the next one... etc.) works!

So, we have here a few parts to make that happen.

The penultimate octet, which is the group ID in hex needs to be two hex digits long, and without adding more python modules to our default machines, we can't use a "pad" filter (to add 0's to the beginning of the mac octets), so we do that by hand:

{% if item.0.ha.group_id|default(0) < 16 %}0{% endif %}

And here's how to convert the group ID into a hex number:

{{ '%0x' | format(item.0.ha.group_id|default(0)|int) }}

Then the next octet is the sum of the VDOM and PortID. First we need to loop around the VDOMs. We don't always know whether we're going to be adding VDOMs until after deployment has started, so here we will assume we've got 3 VDOMs (plus VDOM "0" for management) as it doesn't really matter if we don't end up using them. We create the vdom variable like this:

{% for vdom in range(0, 40, 10) %} STUFF {% endfor %}

We need to put the actual port ID in there too. As we're using a with_subelement loop we can't create an increment, but what we can do is ensure we're recording the interface number. This only works here because the vendor has a sequential port number (port1, port2, etc). We'll need to experiment further with other vendors! So, here's how we're doing this. We already know how to create a hex number, but we do need to use some other Jinja2 filters here:

{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+(item.1.interface|default('1')|replace('port', '')|int)-1) }}

Let's pull this apart a bit further. item.1.interface is the name of the interface, and if it doesn't exist (using the |default('1') part) we replace it with the string "1". So, let's replace that variable with a "normal" value.

{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+("port1"|replace('port', '')|int)-1) }}

Next, we need to remove the word "port" from the string "port1" to make it just "1", so we use the replace filter to strip part of that value out. Let's do that:

{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+("1"|int)-1) }}

After that, we need to turn the string "1" into the literal number 1:

{{ '%0x' | format(vdom+1-1) }}

We loop through vdom several times, but let's pick one instance of that at random - 30 (the fourth iteration of the vdom for-loop):

{{ '%0x' | format(30+1-1) }}

And then we resolve the maths:

{{ '%0x' | format(30) }}

And then the |format(30) turns the '%0x' into the value "1e"

Assuming the vendor prefix is, as I mentioned, 'de:ca:fb:ad:' and the cluster ID is 0, this gives us the following resulting allowed address pairs:

[
{"ip_address": "0.0.0.0/1"},
{"ip_address": "128.0.0.0/1"},
{"ip_address": "0.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:00"},
{"ip_address": "128.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:00"},
{"ip_address": "0.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:0a"},
{"ip_address": "128.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:0a"},
{"ip_address": "0.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:14"},
{"ip_address": "128.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:14"},
{"ip_address": "0.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:1e"},
{"ip_address": "128.0.0.0/1", "mac_address": "de:ca:fb:ad:00:1e"}
]

I hope this has helped you!

Sources of information:

Defining Networks with Ansible

In my day job, I’m using Ansible to provision networks in OpenStack. One of the complaints I’ve had about the way I now define them is that the person implementing the network has to spell out all the network elements – the subnet size, DHCP pool, the addresses of the firewalls and names of those items. This works for a manual implementation process, but is seriously broken when you try to hand that over to someone else to implement. Most people just want something which says “Here is the network I want to implement – 192.0.2.0/24″… and let the system make it for you.

So, I wrote some code to make that happen. It’s not perfect, and it’s not what’s in production (we have lots more things I need to add for that!) but it should do OK with an IPv4 network.

Hope this makes sense!

---
- hosts: localhost
  vars:
  - networks:
      # Defined as a subnet with specific router and firewall addressing
      external:
        subnet: "192.0.2.0/24"
        firewall: "192.0.2.1"
        router: "192.0.2.254"
      # Defined as an IP address and CIDR prefix, rather than a proper network address and CIDR prefix
      internal_1:
        subnet: "198.51.100.64/24"
      # A valid smaller network and CIDR prefix
      internal_2:
        subnet: "203.0.113.0/27"
      # A tiny CIDR network
      internal_3:
        subnet: "203.0.113.64/30"
      # These two CIDR networks are unusable for this environment
      internal_4:
        subnet: "203.0.113.128/31"
      internal_5:
        subnet: "203.0.113.192/32"
      # A massive CIDR network
      internal_6:
        subnet: "10.0.0.0/8"
  tasks:
  # Based on https://stackoverflow.com/a/47631963/5738 with serious help from mgedmin and apollo13 via #ansible on Freenode
  - name: Add router and firewall addressing for CIDR prefixes < 30     set_fact:       networks: >
        {{ networks | default({}) | combine(
          {item.key: {
            'subnet': item.value.subnet | ipv4('network'),
            'router': item.value.router | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('network') | ipv4('int') ) + 1) | ipv4),
            'firewall': item.value.firewall | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('broadcast') | ipv4('int') ) - 1) | ipv4),
            'dhcp_start': item.value.dhcp_start | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('network') | ipv4('int') ) + 2) | ipv4),
            'dhcp_end': item.value.dhcp_end | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('broadcast') | ipv4('int') ) - 2) | ipv4)
          }
        }) }}
    with_dict: "{{ networks }}"
    when: item.value.subnet | ipv4('prefix') < 30   - name: Add router and firewall addressing for CIDR prefixes = 30     set_fact:       networks: >
        {{ networks | default({}) | combine(
          {item.key: {
            'subnet': item.value.subnet | ipv4('network'),
            'router': item.value.router | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('network') | ipv4('int') ) + 1) | ipv4),
            'firewall': item.value.firewall | default((( item.value.subnet | ipv4('broadcast') | ipv4('int') ) - 1) | ipv4)
          }
        }) }}
    with_dict: "{{ networks }}"
    when: item.value.subnet | ipv4('prefix') == 30
  - debug:
      var: networks